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I'm embarrassed by those photos. I wasn't embarrassed
when they were taken, but since then I've become more con-
scious of boys, of my body and myself. Now I just want to be
myself. Those pictures are not me now.'
Child model Brooke Shields spoke these words in 1981 after
filing suit, seeking a permanent injunction under New York's
right of privacy law2 against the use of nude photographs taken
* B.A., University of California at Los Angeles, 1975; M.A., New York University,
1979; J.D., Georgetown University Law Center, 1984. The author wishes to especially
thank Joanne R. Jefferson.
1. Shields v. Gross (Shields III), 88 A.D.2d 846, 850, 451 N.Y.S.2d 419, 423 (1982)
(quoting Brooke and Teri, Us, Jan. 19, 1982, at 65).
2. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTs LAw §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1976). Section 50.provides:
A person, firm or corporation that uses for advertising purposes, or for the
purposes of trade, the name, portrait or picture of any living person without
having first obtained the written consent of such person, or if a minor of his or
her parent or guardian, is guilty of a misdemeanor.
Violations of § 50 are actionable in a civil suit under § 51, which reads:
Any person whose name, portrait or picture is used within this state for ad-
vertising purposes or for the purposes of trade without the written consent
first obtained as above provided may maintain an equitable action in the
supreme court of this state against the person, firm or corporation so using his
name, portrait or picture, to prevent and restrain the use thereof; and may also
sue and recover damages for any injuries sustained by reason of such use and
if the defendant shall have knowingly used such person's name, portrait or
picture in such manner as is forbidden or declared to be unlawful by the last
section of this article, the jury, in its discretion, may award exemplary dam-
ages. But nothing contained in this act shall be so construed as to prevent any
person, firm or corporation, practicing the profession of photography, from ex-
hibiting in or about his or its establishment specimens of the work of such
establishment, unless the same is continued by such person, firm or corpora-
tion after written notice objecting thereto has been given by the person por-
trayed; and nothing contained in this article shall be so construed as to
prevent any person, firm or corporation from using the name, portrait or pic-
ture of any manufacturer or dealer in connection with the goods, wares and
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of her when she was ten years old. For nearly three years, the
case of Shields v. Gross3 was battled on every level of the New
York court system. The various judges continually agreed or
disagreed either with a lower court's ruling, or among them-
selves, but rarely for the same reasons.
This note examines the conflict between New York's civil
rights law sections 50 and 51 and an infant's common law right
to disaffirm contracts through an analysis of the Shields case.4
Initial attention is focused on the special facts of the Shields
case and the various court holdings, from the granting of the
preliminary injunction by the special term court to the deci-
sion of the highest court in New York state, the court of ap-
peals, which did not allow Brooke Shields to invalidate the
contract entered into on her behalf by her mother. The note
then reviews the common law right of infants to disaffirm con-
tracts and presents the historical development of a legal right
to privacy that resulted in the enactment of sections 50 and 51.
An attempt is made to reconcile this right with an infant's com-
mon law right to disaffirm. Thereafter, the note focuses more
specifically on the various legal and factual issues raised in
Shields, including a review of the grounds for granting an in-
junction in this case, the unconscionability argument made by
one concurring opinion at the appellate division level, and the
concerns regarding child pornography.
The note concludes by summarizing the potential effect of
merchandise manufactured, produced or dealt in by him which he has sold or
disposed of with such name, portrait or picture used in connection therewith;
or from using the name, portrait or picture of any author, composer or artist in
connection with his literary, musical or artistic productions which he has sold
or disposed of with such name, portrait or picture used in connection
therewith.
3. Shields v. Gross (Shields I), 186 N.Y.L.J. 4 (Sept. 29, 1981) (N.Y. County Spe-
cial Term) (holding that privacy law denies infant the right to disaffirm contract con-
sented to by parent; preliminary injunction granted pending hearing to determine
scope of consent); Shields v. Gross (Shields 11), 186 N.Y.L.J. 13 (Nov. 16, 1981) (N.Y.
County Trial Term) (consent provision deemed unrestricted; complaint dismissed; de-
fendant restrained in licensing photographs pursuant to stipulation), modified, Shields
III, 88 A.D.2d 846, 451 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1982) (holding privacy law not intended to abrogate
right to disaffirm; defendant permanently restrained from using photographs), modi-
fied, Shields v. Gross (Shields IV), 58 N.Y.2d 338, 448 N.E.2d 108, 461 N.Y.S.2d 254
(1983) (Special and Trial Term decisions reinstated).
4. For a general discussion of contracts involving minors under New York law,
see Graifman, Dealing with Infants-A Primer for Adults, 8 CoLUM.-VLA ART & THE
LAw 43 (1983).
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In 1975, plaintiff Brooke Shields was a ten-year old child
model, and her mother and legal guardian, Teri Shields, acted
as her business manager and promoter. During that year a
number of modeling jobs were arranged by Mrs. Shields
through the Ford Model Agency with defendant photographer,
Gary Gross.' The particular job which became the subject of
this litigation included a series of photographs, financed by
Playboy Press, requiring Brooke to pose nude in a bathtub.
The photos were to be used in a publication entitled "Portfolio
8" and later renamed "Sugar and Spice. '
Defendant Gross apparently intended to "depict the woman
in the little girl to highlight the sensuality of pre-pubescent
youth. 7 The point of the photographs was to contrast the wo-
manly face against her formless body.8 When the project was
proposed to Brooke and Teri Shields, they "readily agreed."9
Since the photo session with Gross would include both clothed
and unclothed shots, two consent or release forms were exe-
cuted by Mrs. Shields in favor of the defendant.1" The forms,
5. Shields 11, 186 N.Y.L.J. at 13.
6. Shields IV, 58 N.Y.2d at 342, 448 N.E.2d at 109, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 255. The publica-
tion was distributed by Simon & Schuster. Shields I, 186 N.Y.L.J. at 4.
7. Shields II, 186 N.Y.L.J. at 13.
8. Id.
9. Id. The trial term court stated that Gross was also interested in the pictures
for a private, noncommercial project of his own. This project contrasted the nude pho-
tographs of Brooke with two other child models who were fully clothed and in makeup.
The court looked at the results of Gross's project and stated, "he is not a pornographer,
but a photographer of extraordinary talent." Id.
Gross also wanted to use the photographs in a "full length art book" after they were
published by Playboy Press. Shields III, 88 A.D.2d at 849, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 422 (Asch, J.,
concurring). No further reference was made in any of the other opinions to Gross's
ancillary noncommercial use of these photographs.
10. Shields 11, 186 N.Y.L.J. at 13. The release read as follows:
Model Release-For and in consideration of my engagement as a model by
Gary Gross, hereafter referred to as the photographer, on terms or fee herein-
after stated, I hereby give the photographer, his legal representatives and as-
signs, those for whom the photographer is acting, and those acting with his
permission, or his employees, the right and permission to copyright and/or
use, reuse and/or publish, and republish photographic pictures or portraits of
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similar to those used by most publishing houses, granted un-
restricted consent, permitting the photographer to "'use, re-
use, and/or publish or republish' the photographs.""
The photographs were first published in a pamphlet entitled
"Little Women," put out by the Hennegan Publishing Com-
pany." When Playboy Press published "Sugar and Spice," two
of the photographs of Brooke were "sandwiched with pictures
by other photographers of full-grown and mature nude mod-
els.' 3 Thereafter, two of the nude pictures appeared in a
"larger-than-life" photographic blow-up in the window of the
Charles Jourdan Salon on Fifth Avenue in New York City. 4
Subsequently, the plaintiff's mother sought and obtained de-
fendant's consent to use one of the bathtub pictures in a book
published about Brooke Shields entitled The Brooke Book."
In 1978, several of the photos of Brooke, clothed and un-
clothed, appeared in a French magazine called Photo. Brooke
apparently did not find out about the reprints in Photo maga-
zine until 1980.16 Disturbed by this publication and the infor-
mation that Gross intended further commercial use of the
me, or in which I may be distored [sic] in character, or form, in conjunction
with my own or a fictitious name, or reproductions thereof in color, or black
and white made through any media by the photographer at his studio or else-
where, for any purpose whatsoever, including the use of any printed matter in
conjunction therewith.
I hereby waive any right to inspect or approve the finished photograph or
advertising copy or printed matter that may be used in conjunction therewith
or to the eventual use that it might be applied.
I hereby release, discharge and agree to save harmless the photographer, his
representatives, assigns, employees or any person or persons, corporation or
corporations, acting under his permission or authority, or any person, persons,
corporation or corporations, for whom he might be acting, including any firm
publishing and/or distributing the finished product, in whole or in part, from
and against any liability as a result of any distortion, blurring or alteration,
optical illusion, or use in composite form, either intentionally or otherwise,
that may occur or be produced in the taking, processing or reproduction.
11. Gtarbus & Kurnit, Importance of the Shields Case, 189 N.Y.L.J. 5 (1983).
12. Shields II, 186 N.Y.L.J. at 13. In this action Shields does not protest that
publication.
13. Id.
14. Id.; Shields IV, 58 N.Y.2d at 338, 448 N.E.2d at 109, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 255. The case
opinions did not indicate which year the photographs appeared in the window, or if the
plaintiff was informed that they would be so displayed. It is also not clear whether
plaintiff was appalled by this particular display in conjunction with other uses, or
whether the court mentioned it as a means of illustrating their broad use.
15. Shields 11, 186 N.Y.L.J. at 13. The book was published by Wallabee Press. The
author tried to obtain a copy in several bookstores, but was told the book was returned
because it was not selling.
16. Shields IV, 58 N.Y.2d at 342, 448 N.E.2d at 109, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 255.
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photographs, she attempted, without success, to purchase the
negatives or obtain a first option on their use from Gross.17 The
pictures appeared in other publications of "dubious respecta-
bility" in addition to Photo; Gross, however, denied ever having
licensed the use of the pictures in such publications.18
B. Special Term and Trial Term Decisions
In 1981, the plaintiff brought an action in tort and contract in
the Special Term Court of New York seeking compensatory
and punitive damages and a permanent injunction. She also
moved for a preliminary injunction to enjoin Gross from fur-
ther use of the photographs pursuant to sections 50 and 51 of
the Civil Rights Law. The special term court granted the pre-
liminary injunction on the theory that factual issues remained
regarding the meaning and validity of the consents signed by
Mrs. Shields. However, it also concluded that the consent pro-
visions of sections 50 and 51 nullified an infant's right to disaf-
firm a contract to which the parent has consented. 9
Adhering to the findings of the special term court as to an
infant's right to disaffirm under the New York's privacy law,
the trial term court ruled that the factual issues to be deter-
mined were limited to whether or not Mrs. Shields had exe-
cuted a conditional or unconditional release to Gross for the
use of the photographs, and whether their use, beyond the
original purpose for which they were shot for Playboy Press,
would subject the plaintiff to irreparable harm.
Addressing the releases first, the trial term court concluded
that the releases were valid and that they did not recite that
the pictures were to be used for a specific purpose. It noted
that the history of Mrs. Shields's relationship with Gross, as
well as with other photographers, did not indicate a general
practice of restricting photographs to the initial use by the pay-
ing sponsor only.20 In fact, the court mentioned that previous
photographs of Brooke taken by Gross for Avon, Penthouse,
Courtaldt's, and New York Magazine had been reused by per-
17. Shields 11, 186 N.Y.L.J. at 13; Shields IIl, 88 A.D.2d at 846, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 420.
18. Shields II, 186 N.Y.L.J. at 13. From the opinion, it may be inferred that the
blowup photo in the salon window was licensed by Gross, because the court never
referred to it as an unauthorized use.
19. See supra note 2 for the full text of §§ 50-51.
20. Shields II, 186 N.Y.L.J. at 13.
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sons other than the original sponsor.2'
The trial term court found that, while Brooke's embarrass-
ment was understandable, her personal reaction and that of
her friends were not tantamount to irreparable harm: "This is
especially so in view of the nature of the films in which she has
appeared, which are suggestive if not explicit in what they re-
veal. It is an inevitable consequence of the public role which
has been projected for her as distinguished from her private
life., 22
The trial term court further found that because Brooke had
waited so long before protesting the alternative uses of the
photographs, any recovery would be precluded by the doc-
trines of laches and estoppel.23 In dismissing the complaint,
the court concluded that Gross was free to utilize the photo-
graphs for legitimate purposes; however, it restrained him
from licensing the use of such photographs to pornographic
magazines or to those "whose appeal is of a predominantly
prurient interest. ' 24 Although the trial term court did not ex-
plicitly so state, Gross was apparently charged with the duty of
policing the use of these photographs.25
C. Appellate Division Opinion
Brooke Shields appealed to New York's Supreme Court, Ap-
pellate Division, which disagreed with the conclusion reached
by the lower courts and held that Brooke could lawfully disaf-
firm her mother's consent and had done so. Accordingly, the
appellate division reversed the special term court and enjoined
the defendant from using the photos for purposes of advertis-
ing or trade.26 While the majority of justices on the appellate
court agreed to restrict Gross's use of the photographs, they




24. Apparently, this modified restriction on the use of the photographs had already
been proposed by the defendant and the court merely accepted his stipulation. See
infra notes 107-24 and accompanying text.
25. See Shields III, 88 A.D.2d at 848, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 421; Shields IV, 58 N.Y.2d at 342,
448 N.E.2d at 110, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 255.
26. Shields III, 88 A.D.2d at 847-48, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 420 (Asch, J., concurring).
27. Id., 451 N.Y.S.2d at 421. Of the five justices who heard the Shields case, all
concurred with the majority opinion, except Presiding Justice Kuperman, who also
wrote a separate memorandum, and Justice Asch, who concurred specially in a sepa-
rate opinion. Justice Carro dissented.
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Three justices voted to fully restrict Gross's use of the photo-
graphs for any use in advertising or trade based on an infant's
common law right to disaffirm a contract, even when consent
has been signed on his behalf by a parent or guardian.28 They
did not feel that the legislature had limited an infant's common
law right to disaffirm under sections 50 and 51 because such a
limitation was not specifically set forth in the privacy law as it
had been in other statutes.29 These justices viewed the paren-
tal consent requirement of New York's privacy law as provid-
ing protection for someone who has secured such consent;30
they did not see the statutes as placing a restriction on an in-
fant's right to disaffirm.1'
28. Id. See, e.g., Lee v. Silver, 262 A.D. 149,28 N.Y.S.2d 333 (1941); Aborn v. Janis, 62
Misc. 95, 113 N.Y.S. 309 (1907).
29. Shields II1, 88 A.D.2d at 847, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 420.
30. Id. at 848, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 421.
31. One justice, in a concurring opinion, stated that he believed that the releases
were for a specific purpose only and not for any future use. Shields III, 88 A.D.2d at
848, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 421 (Kuperman, P.J., concurring). Justice Kuperman probably
came to this conclusion based on the fact that the words "Playboy Press" were printed
in the upper left hand corner of each release form. However, the trial term judge had
concluded that this notation was not made until after the releases had been signed by
Mrs. Shields. He characterized the words as mere identification rather than words of
restriction sufficient to modify the release as plaintiff claimed. Shields II, 186 N.Y.L.J.
at 13.
Alternatively Justice Kuperman believed that even if the releases had an indefinite
life beyond current usage, New York General Obligations Law § 3-105 would require
that the court approve the release first, and even then, that the release would only be
good for three years; since the pictures of Brooke were taken in 1975 and the action
brought in 1981, she could then still maintain the right to disaffirm. Shields III, 88
A.D.2d at 848, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 421. Section 3-105(1) provides:
1. A contract made by an infant or made by a parent or guardian of an in-
fant, or a contract proposed to be so made, under which (a) the infant is to
perform or render services as an actor, actress, dancer, musician, vocalist or
other performing artist, or as a participant or player in professional sports, or
(b) a person is employed to render services to the infant in connection with
such services of the infant or in connection with contracts therefor, may be
approved by the supreme court or the surrogate's court as provided in this
section where the infant is a resident of this state or the services of the infant
are to be performed or rendered in this state. If the contract is so approved
the infant may not, either during his minority or upon reaching his majority,
disaffirm the contract on the ground of infancy or assert that the parent or
guardian lacked authority to make the contract. A contract modified, amended
or assigned after its approval under this section shall be deemed a new
contract.
Section 3-105(2) (d) provides:
d. No contract shall be approved if the term during which the infant is to
perform or render services or during which a person is employed to render
services to the infant, including any extensions thereof by option or otherwise,
extends for a period of more than three years from the date of approval of the
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D. New York Court of Appeals Decision
Gary Gross appealed to the New York Court of Appeals re-
questing reinstatement of the trial term judgment. Plaintiff
Brooke Shields cross-appealed, requesting that the appellate
division judgment be modified so as to enjoin Gross from using
the photographs for any purpose or, at a minimum, that the
appellate division judgment be affirmed.
3 2
The court of appeals reversed the appellate division and re-
instated the trial term judgment. Since the appellate division
accepted the trial term court's findings that the consents were
valid and unrestricted as to time and use, the court of appeals
focused only on the legal effect to be given to the parent's con-
sent under sections 50 and 51.31
The Shields case raises several important issues regarding
an infant's common law right to disaffirm a contract and the
creation of a statutory right of privacy. As stated above, an
analysis of this case must begin with a general review of the
infant's common law right to disaffirm contracts.
contract. If the contract contains any other covenant or condition which ex-
tends beyond such three years, the same may be approved if found to be rea-
sonable and for such period as the court may determine.
The New York legislature enacted a new Chapter 11-C of the Consolidated Laws by
L. 1983, c. 876, § 1, effective December 31, 1983. It is referred to as the Arts & Cultural
Affairs Law. General Obligations Law § 3-105 was repealed and replaced with the Arts
& Cultural Affairs Law § 35.03. The pertinent sections cited above have not changed.
A second justice also concurred in the holding of the appellate division, but he con-
sidered the rationale used by the other concurring justices to be "fraught with legal
uncertainty;" he felt that their construction of the legislature's intent in passing §§ 50-
51 could be nullified by legislative action. Shields III, 88 A.D.2d at 848, 451 N.Y.S.2d at
421-22 (Asch, J., concurring). He felt it would be more appropriate to classify the
purchase of the photographs of Brooke Shields as a sale of goods under § 2-302 of the
U.C.C., thereby allowing the court to police outrageous transactions. Id. For further
discussion of this unconscionability argument, see infra notes 125-35 and accompany-
ing text.
The dissent to the appellate division opinion agreed with the trial term findings that
the consents conformed to the requirements of §§ 50-51, thereby providing the defend-
ant with a complete defense. Shields III, 88 A.D.2d at 851-52, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 424-25
(Carro, J., dissenting). The dissent pointed out that §§ 50-51 created a new right of
privacy not previously recognized by common law, thereby establishing a remedy
against a party who would not otherwise be liable. Consequently, the statute must be
strictly construed in accordance with the rules of statutory construction. Id. If strictly
construed, the majority could not assume that the legislature intended the common
law right of infants to disaffirm should survive enactment of §§ 50-51. For this reason,
the dissent also ruled out the possibility of using the unconscionability statute or the
General Obligations Law as a means of circumventing strict construction.
32. Shields IV, 58 N.Y.2d at 343-44, 448 N.E.2d at 110, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 256.
33. Id.
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III
Analysis
A. Common Law Rule Regarding Contracts by Infants
Under the earliest common law of this country, all contracts
by infants were void.34 This rule was later modified to provide
that only certain transactions, such as the execution of a prom-
issory note, would be considered void; the rest were consid-
ered voidable.35 Today, contracts by infants are considered
voidable, but never void.36 Moreover, most states have recog-
nized certain statutory situations where an infant can never
avoid a contract on the grounds of infancy. These encompass
such transactions as educational loans,
37 banking insurance, 38
34. See, e.g., Henry v. Root, 33 N.Y. 526 (1865); Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box
Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902); Aborn v. Janis, 62 Misc. 95, 113 N.Y.S. 309 (1907);
Lee v. Silver, 262 A.D. 149, 28 N.Y.S.2d 333 (1941); Janklow v. Williams, 43 Misc. 2d 1053,
252 N.Y.S.2d 785 (1964); Prinze v. Jonas, 38 N.Y.2d 570, 345 N.E.2d 295, 381 N.Y.S.2d 824
(1976); Del Santo v. Bristol County Stadium, Inc., 273 F.2d 605 (1st Cir. 1960).
The general rule of law is that an infant has not the capacity to bind himself
absolutely by contracts, since any contract made by him during his infancy
may be avoided [citation omitted]. Of course, this rule yields to the exception
that, where an infant's contract is to his benefit, it is good and binding upon
him; when it is to his prejudice, it is void; and when it is of an uncertain nature
as to benefit or prejudice, it is voidable only at the election of the infant.
Kaufman v. American Youth Hostels, Inc., 13 Misc. 2d 8, 14, 174 N.Y.S.2d 580, 588-89
(1957), modified, 6 A.D.2d 223, 177 N.Y.S.2d 587 (1958), modified, 5 N.Y.2d 1016, 158
N.E.2d 128, 185 N.Y.S.2d 268 (1959).
35. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, CONTRACTS § 8-2, at 232 (2d ed. 1977). A contract is
void, "a contradiction in terms," when it produces no legal obligation upon the part of
the promisor. A contract is voidable if one or more of the parties has the power to elect
to avoid the legal relations created by the contract or by ratification to extinguish the
power of avoidance. Id. § 1-11, at 18.
36. Fisher v. Cattani, 53 Misc. 2d 221, 278 N.Y.S.2d 420 (1966). A contract with an
infant is referred to as voidable because it is valid until disaffirmed by the infant. The
issue then becomes whether the infant has given sufficient notice to effectively termi-
nate the contract. In Fisher, the court concluded that notice sent by registered mail
was sufficient for proper disaffirmance. The court stated that the method used ex-
ceeded the standard usually applied to such acts. Id. at 222, 278 N.Y.S.2d at 421. In
Michigan, contracts by infants are not voidable even on grounds of infancy during in-
fancy. The Michigan courts claim that allowing disaffirmance while infancy continues
is not logical since an infant is not in a position to know whether or not the contract
should be annulled. See, e.g., Dunton v. Brown, 31 Mich. 182 (1875); Poli v. National
Bank of Detroit, 355 Mich. 17, 93 N.W.2d 925 (1959). Disaffirmance by an infant on any
grounds other than infancy is still available in Michigan.
37. See also UNIFORM MINOR STUDENT CAPACITY TO BORROW ACT, 9A U.L.A. 223
(1979). This act generally makes a minor who is 16 years of age or older legally respon-
sible for educational loans and allows no right to disaffirm so long as the educational
institution certifies that the person is enrolled prior to the making of the educational
loan.
38. CALAMARI & PEmLLO, supra note 35, § 8-3, at 234.
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military enlistments,39 contracts to furnish an infant with
"necessaries,"" and contracts approved by a court.4 '
Despite the various statutory exceptions, as a general rule
infants in the United States still retain the right to rescind and
repudiate a contract even when, as in the Shields case, the con-
tract is entered into on the infant's behalf by a parent or legal
guardian.42 Generally, there are no statutory limitations on an
infant's right to disaffirm prior to his attaining majority.43
When avoidance is sought, the general rule is that the infant
must disaffirm the entire contract, not just a portion of it.,
However, once the infant has attained majority, avoidance of
the contract must take place within a reasonable time thereaf-
ter.45 What constitutes a "reasonable time" is usually decided
by the court, based on the circumstances of the case if it is not
specifically set forth in a statute.46
39. Id.
40. 42 AM. JuR. 2D Infants § 67 (1969). Necessaries are generally personal necessi-
ties for the body and mind. They are determined on a case-by-case basis and some-
times have included articles needed for business purposes. Accord Sykes v.
Dickerson, 216 Ark. 116, 224 S.W.2d 360 (1949); Sternlieb v. Normandie Nat'l Sec. Corp.,
263 N.Y. 245, 188 N.E. 726 (1934); CAL. CIV. CODE § 36 (West 1982).
41. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAw § 3-105 (McKinney 1978) (contracts of employ-
ment as an entertainer or athlete); CAL. Crv. CODE § 36(2) (West 1982) (contracts with
infant professional athletes or performing artists). See also Warner Bros. v. Brodel, 31
Cal.2d 766, 192 P.2d 949 (1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 844, reh'g denied, 335 U.S. 873
(1948). See also 42 AM. Jua. 2D Infants § 81 (1969).
42. Aborn v. Janis, 62 Misc. 95, 113 N.Y.S. 309 (1907); Lee v. Silver, 262 A.D. 149, 28
N.Y.S.2d 333 (1941).
43. Janklow v. Williams, 43 Misc.2d 1053, 252 N.Y.S.2d 785 (1964). But see supra
note 40.
44. A minor disaffirming a contract must disaffirm the entire contract not just the
"irksome portions." Holland v. Universal Underwriters, Inc., 270 Cal.App. 2d 417, 75 Cal.
Rptr. 669 (1969). If an infant repudiates a contract it must be in its entirety. Farin v.
Sercarz, 179 Misc. 490, 39 N.Y.S.2d 482 (1943).
45. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 35, § 8-4, at 236. For contract purposes, major-
ity is considered to be 18 years old in most states. E.g., CAL. Crv. CODE § 25.1 (West
1982); IDAHO CODE § 32-101 (1983); IOWA CODE ANN. § 599.1 (West 1981); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 41-1-101 (1983); N.Y. GEN. OBLG. LAw § 1-202 (McKinney 1978); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 14-10-01 (1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 13 (West 1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAwS ANN.
§ 26-1-1 (1981); UTAH CODE ANN. § 15-2-1 (Supp. 1981); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26-28.010
(Supp. 1983).
46. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 35, § 8-4, at 235-37. Examples of states using
the reasonable time standard are: CAL. Crv. CODE § 35 (West 1982); IDAHO CODE § 32-
103 (1983); IOWA CODE ANN. § 599.2 (West 1981); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-1-304 (1983);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 15-2-2 (1973); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.28.030 (1961). Examples of
states setting a time limit of within one year of majority are: N.D. CENT. CODE § 4-10-11
(1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 19 (West 1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAwS ANN. § 26-2-6
(1976).
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B. Right of Privacy
The initial issue in the Shields case was whether or not an
infant's common law right to disaffirm a contract had been re-
stricted by the enactment of sections 50 and 51. The special
term court established early in the case that such a right is lim-
ited by the language of the privacy law so that, once consent is
obtained in accordance with the statute, injunctive relief and
damages are not available.47 Based on other instances where
the New York legislature had abrogated the infant's disaffirm-
ance right, the special term judge believed that sections 50 and
51 were also intended to deny an infant the right to disaffirm
where consent is executed by the parent.48
1. Establishment of the Privacy Law
Had the Shields case occurred prior to the 1903 enactment of
sections 50 and 51, the consent given by Mrs. Shields to photo-
graph her daughter nude could have been avoided by Brooke
as a simple contract action on grounds of infancy; whether the
releases were for restricted or unrestricted use would have
been immaterial. However, had there been no express or im-
plied contract between Brooke and Gross, there would have
been no legal remedy available to prevent the release of the
photographs, because prior to 1903 New York did not recognize
a cause of action for "invasion of privacy." Without a contract,
Gross would have been able to use the photographs any way
he wanted.49
The New York Court of Appeals faced this very problem-
47. Shields 1, 186 N.Y.L.J. at 4 (Helman, J.).
48. Id. The special term court cited as examples: (1) the N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law § 3-
105, in which court approval of an infant's contract involving theatrical or musical per-
formance cannot be disaffirmed even though court approval can be revoked, see supra
note 31; (2) the education law which denies disaffirmance to infants over 16 years old
who contracted for educational loans; (3) the insurance law which denies disaffirm-
ance of a contract for life insurance after the age of 15; (4) the statutory restrictions on
disaffirmance of real estate contracts involving a home by a minor husband or wife;
and (5) the denial of disaffirmance of bank loans after an infant reaches 18.
The court of appeals supported the special term's interpretation of the legislative
intent based on other statutes when it said:
it is clear that the Legislature may abrogate an infant's common-law right to
disaffirm .... Where a statute expressly permits a certain class of agree-
ments to be made by infants, that settles the question and makes the agree-
ment valid ... no words prohibiting disaffirmance are necessary to effectuate
the legislative intent.
Shields IV, 58 N.Y.2d at 345, 448 N.E.2d at 111, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 257.
49. Under the circumstances described in the text, the one possible action avail-
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whether or not a plaintiff has a legitimate cause of action for
invasion of privacy where no contract exists-when it decided
Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co. 10 in 1902. Roberson in-
volved an action brought by an infant plaintiff whose picture
had been printed, without her consent, on the defendant's flour
bags to advertise its products. The plaintiff had based her
claim on a right to privacy. In a four-to-three decision, the
court denied the existence of any right to privacy at common
law and said that in order for such a right to exist, it must be
created by the legislature.5 '
The Roberson decision had quite an impact, not only on the
lower New York courts, which had recognized a common law
right of privacy in many of their prior decisions,5 2 but also on
the public and the legislature. 3 Based on the circumstances
set forth in Roberson, the New York legislature enacted sec-
tions 50 and 51, making it a misdemeanor and a tort to use the
name, portrait, or picture of any person for purposes of adver-
tising or trade without his or her written consent.
54
2. Consent Under the Privacy Law
Under sections 50 and 51 of the New York Civil Rights Law,
the plaintiff in Roberson would have prevailed because the de-
fendant had not obtained written consent to use the pictures
from either the infant or her parent or guardian. However, in
the Shields case, some form of written consent was signed by
the plaintiff's mother and legal guardian. Therefore an addi-
tional issue in Shields v. Gross was whether the consent given
was for a restricted or unrestricted use. Had the permission
been given for restricted use only, then Brooke might have
won an action for breach of contract against Gross. The trial
term court, however, determined that the consent contained no
restrictions on how, when, or by whom the pictures could be
able to Shields might have been in tort, but then only if the pictures constituted defa-
mation. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 802-04 (4th ed. 1971).
50. 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902).
51. Id. at 545, 64 N.E. at 442.
52. PROSSER, supra note 49, at 803. Apparently, it was the article written by Sa-
muel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, entitled The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV.
193 (1890), which motivated the lower New York courts to recognize such a right. See,
e.g., MacKenzie v. Soden Mineral Springs Co., 27 Abb. N. Cas. 402, 18 N.Y.S. 240 (1891);
Marks v. Jaffa, 6 Misc. 290,26 N.Y.S. 908 (1893); Schuyler v. Curtis, 147 N.Y. 434, 42 N.E.
22 (1895).
53. PROSSERt, supra note 49, at 803.
54. See supra note 2 for the text of the statutes.
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C. Reconciliation of the Privacy Law with the Right to Disaffirm
The Shields complaint was apparently brought under sec-
tions 50 and 51, not because Brooke asserted that consent had
not been given, but because she claimed that the consent per-
mitted only restricted use. In any event, she contended that
she had the right to disaffirm her mother's consent based on
common law and the statute. 6 If the nature of the consent
given had been the only issue raised, the case would have been
disposed of immediately by the trial term's holding that the re-
leases were unrestricted. Once it was determined, however,
that the consent contained no restrictions, the only means of
redress left to Brooke was to continue to argue that her com-
mon law right to disaffirm the consent signed by her mother on
her behalf had not been eliminated by the enactment of the
privacy law.
1. Does the Privacy Law Abrogate the Right to Disaffirm?
On appeal, the effect to be given the unrestricted consent
was the only issue focused on by the appellate division and
court of appeals. The appellate division found that the statute
did not preclude disaffirmance, while the court of appeals
found that the privacy law did prohibit nullification of the con-
tract. This common law right to disaffirm and the abrogation of
that right under sections 50 and 51 served to be the major divid-
ing point among the majority, concurring, and dissenting opin-
ions within and among the various courts.
The court of appeals' holding that section 50 had eliminated
an infant's right to disaffirm where parental consent is given
directly reversed the appellate division's determination that,
because the statute did not specifically address this issue, the
55. Shields H, 186 N.Y.L.J. at 13.
56. Shields I, 186 N.Y.L.J. at 4. For an example of a § 51 action where the plaintiff
claimed restricted consent was given, compare, Welch v. Mr. Christmas, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d
143, 148 (1982), in which the plaintiff won compensatory damages when the defendant
allowed distributors to rebroadcast a commercial that the plaintiff had acted in after
the plaintiff's written consent to use his name and photograph had expired. The de-
fendant claimed that the plaintiffs only action should have been for breach of contract
rather than § 51 because of the plaintiff's prior written consent. The court said the
plaintiff had the right to determine the length of the consent and that its "use after
expiration of the effective period of consent is no less an invasion of privacy than its
use without consent." The plaintiff in Welch was not an infant.
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statute did not disturb the minor's right. The appellate divi-
sion believed that the rights being protected did not require an
interpretation of section 50 that limited such common law
rights. In agreement with this belief, the dissent to the court of
appeals decision stressed that the majority holding has the ef-
fect of forever forbidding a child from disaffirming a consent
given by his parents, thereby depriving minors of an important
protection." The dissent felt that the legislature intended not
to abrogate the minor's right to disaffirm a contract, but rather
to afford a minor added protection against exploitation: "The
assumption, of course, was that a parent would protect the
child's interests.5 8
As it presently stands, the court of appeals' decision estab-
lishes that an infant cannot disaffirm a contract consented to
by his parents to use his name, portrait, or picture in advertis-
ing or trade. The interpretation of sections 50 and 51 as totally
precluding an infant's right to disaffirm may arguably be too
broad a reading of the statute. Section 51 establishes a statu-
tory action for an invasion of privacy that was not otherwise
available to infants or adults alike at common law. It provides
an offensive basis for a suit by a person whose name, portrait,
or picture has been used without consent, while compliance
with the consent provision of section 50 provides a statutory
defense for the person, firm, or corporation accused of such an
unauthorized use. Section 51 as written, however, does not
state the reverse. The statute does not say that a party who
57. Shields IV, 58 N.Y.2d at 347, 448 N.E.2d at 112, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 258 (Jasen, J.,
dissenting). One concurring appellate justice disagreed with the trial term's conclu-
sion that the consent had been unrestricted. His opinion stressed that the circum-
stances indicated that the photographs were for a specific purpose, and not for future
use, because the defendant had not paid for the pictures himself and the remuneration
received by Brooke had come from the third-party commissioners of the photos.
Shields III, 88 A.D.2d at 848, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 421 (Kupferman, P.J., concurring). He was
alone, however, in this interpretation of the legal parameters of the release, although a
second concurring appellate justice believed that the unlimited terms of the contract
were unconscionable given the subject matter of the photographs and the plaintiffs
age. Id. at 848-49, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 421 (Asch, J., concurring). See infra notes 125-35 and
accompanying text.
Despite the different holdings reached by the trial term court and the appellate divi-
sion, the majority of the appellate division could find no reason to disturb the trial
term's conclusion that the consent forms were valid and unrestricted. Shields III, 88
A.D.2d at 847, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 420. The court of appeals suggested that the exposure
and publicity of a child can be limited if the parent simply limits the use authorized in
the consent form. Shields IV, 58 N.Y.2d at 347, 448 N.E.2d at 112, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 258.
58. Shields IV, 58 N.Y.2d at 347, 448 N.E.2d at 113, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 258 (Jasen, J.,
dissenting).
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uses another's name, portrait, or picture can bring an action in
equity to prevent and restrain the withdrawal of consent, or
can sue for damages because consent has been withdrawn.
Let us assume, for the moment, that the same consents used
by Gross and Shields are executed and that there is no conten-
tion they are restricted, but that Brooke does not sue for an
invasion of privacy and merely seeks to avoid the contract.
Prior to the Shields case an infant could have simply disaf-
firmed the contract, without bringing suit, by some act which
clearly indicated an intention to avoid the contract. 9 Under
such a situation, the photographer might have fied suit for
breach of contract, but the minor would have had the affirma-
tive defense of infancy. The photographer in this hypothetical
should not be able to use offensively sections 50 and 51 to initi-
ate a breach of contract action against an infant contractee to
allow him to continue using the infant's photographs. He
should be allowed to raise the issue of consent granted under
sections 50 and 51 only as a defense to a privacy action brought
against him, because, as it will be shown, the intent of the leg-
islature in passing sections 50 and 51 was apparently only to
establish a right of privacy unavailable at common law.
It appears, then, that the court of appeals decision in Shields
leaves unresolved two issues: (1) whether a photographer con-
tracting with an infant in the future can use the Shields deci-
sion to enforce a contract between himself and a minor who
has or has not tried to disaffirm; and (2) whether an infant can
disaffirm a consent contract to use his name, portrait, or pic-
ture outside of instituting a section 51 action for invasion of
privacy.
In light of the court of appeals' holding in Shields, it seems
plausible that in the next case involving similar facts, a photog-
rapher could succeed on a breach of contract action against the
minor even if the minor himself did not institute a section 51
action. The photographer's complaint could, in that case, spe-
cifically request the court to take judicial notice60 of the court
of appeals' determination in Shields, that the legislative intent
59. Id. at 350, 448 N.E.2d at 113, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 260.
60. N.Y. Crv. PR.c. R. § 4511(b) (McKinney 1963) provides in pertinent part:
Judicial notice shall be taken of matters specified in this subdivision if a
party requests it, furnishes the court sufficient information to enable it to com-
ply with the request and has given each adverse party notice of his intention
to request it. Notice shall be given in the pleadings or prior to the presentation
of any evidence at the trial, but a court may require or permit other notice.
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of sections 50 and 51 precluded an infant from disaffirming con-
sent once given by a parent for use of the infant's name, pic-
ture, or portrait for purposes of advertising or trade.61 Under
those circumstances, the court could then conclude that the
statute does have the effect of precluding a minor from disaf-
firming a written contract of consent for such use.
If this conclusion prevailed in such a case, the effect would
be to make sections 50 and 51 available to photographers who
found themselves facing a contract voided due to infancy,
whether or not a privacy action were brought by the infant.
The court has discretion to consider any "testimony, document, information or argu-
ment on the subject, whether offered by a party or discovered through its own re-
search." Id. § 4511(d). It is well settled in New York that all courts are required to
take judicial notice of the public statutes and decisional law of the forum. See People
v. Herkimer, 4 Cow. 345 (N.Y. 1825); People v. Cooper, 112 Misc. 2d 277, 446 N.Y.S.2d 965
(1981). There are cases in New York holding that the court can take judicial notice of
legislative journals, manuals, and commissions created by the legislature. See gener-
ally Browne v. City of N.Y., 213 A.D. 206, 211 N.Y.S. 306, affd, 241 N.Y. 96, 149 N.E. 211
(1925); Cockcroft v. Mitchell, 187 A.D. 189, 173 N.Y.S. 903 (1919), affd, 230 N.Y. 630, 130
N.E. 921 (1921); Greenwood v. Curran, 202 Misc. 493, 116 N.Y.S.2d 702, affd, 280 A.D. 947,
116 N.Y.S.2d 121 (1952).
61. Shields IV, 58 N.Y.2d at 346, 448 N.E.2d at 111, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 256. The general
rule is that avoidance of a contract must be evidenced by some unequivocal act which
indicates the present intention to avoid the former contract. Infants, supra note 40,
§ 89. See also Spencer v. Collins, 156 Cal. 298, 104 P. 320 (1909); Fisher v. Cattani, 278
N.Y.S.2d 420, 53 Misc. 2d 221 (1966). There is no requirement that disaffirmance fulfill
any prescribed form or ceremony; any manifestation of unwillingness to be bound by
the transaction is sufficient. Infants, supra note 40, § 89; CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra
note 35, at 235.
In the Shields case, it was not clear, until Brooke brought the suit, that she was
manifesting a desire to forbid the defendant's use of the photographs. Prior to the suit,
at least one of the photographs had been purchased by the plaintiff and published in
her own book. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. The plaintiff had even tried
to negotiate a repurchase agreement or first option on their use. Shields II, 186
N.Y.L.J. at 13. These actions alone probably would not be sufficient to manifest to the
defendant that the plaintiff did not want the photographs to continue to be published.
Nevertheless, the commencement of an action to set aside the transaction is gener-
ally considered by a court to be sufficient to constitute a disaffirmance of the contract,
thereby rendering it null and void. Kaufman v. American Youth Hostels, Inc., 13 Misc.
2d 8, 15, 174 N.Y.S.2d 580, 589 (1957). In Kaufman, the deceased daughter of the plain-
tiff had signed a covenant not to sue the defendant. The court said, "[T] he commence-
ment of the present action by plaintiff as Administrator of his deceased infant
daughter constitutes a disaffirmance which renders the covenant not to sue, insofar as
signed by said infant, null and void." Id. at 15, 174 N.Y.S.2d at 589; see also CALAMARI &
PERILLO, supra note 35; Del Santo v. Bristol County Stadium, Inc., 273 F.2d 605 (1st Cir.
1960).
The view is that an act intending to avoid the former transaction need not expressly
disaffirm it; if that act and the former transaction are inconsistent, that is sufficient.
Infants, supra note 40, § 89. See, e.g., Mustard v. Wohlford, 56 Va. 329, 76 A.D. 209
(1859). Therefore, the mere instituting of a § 51 action could reasonably be interpreted
as an act disaffirming the contract.
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The only real defense available to an infant in this case would
be that the legislature intended the statute to have the effect of
abrogating an infant's common law right to disaffirm where a
right of privacy action was first instituted by a minor when con-
sent had been given. If such an argument prevailed, the
Shields decision would be effectively narrowed, providing an
affirmative defense to individuals only when they faced section
51 actions brought by minors wishing to disaffirm a written
contract of consent given by a parent or guardian.
2. Whom Does the Privacy Law Protect?
The issue appears to boil down to the question of whom the
legislature intended to protect when it enacted sections 50 and
51.62 The court of appeals in Shields initially characterized the
legislation as a means of protecting those persons whose
names, portraits, or pictures are used without written con-
sent :63 "The statute acts to restrict an advertiser's prior unre-
strained common-law right to use another's photograph until
written consent is obtained. Once written consent is obtained,
however, the photograph may be published as permitted by its
terms."64 At the same time, the court interpreted sections 50
and 51 as serving the purpose of bringing "certainty to an im-
portant industry which necessarily uses minors for its work. ' 6
Thus, the court of appeals focused its attention not only on the
person whose privacy is invaded without written permission,
but also on the need of the advertising and modeling industries
to be assured that their right to use another's photograph will
not be arbitrarily deprived after written consent has been
obtained.
The majority opinion of the appellate division, however, did
not construe the wording of sections 50 and 51 as manifesting a
legislative intent to limit the common law rights of an infant.
Specifically, the court said:
The manifest purpose of the requirement of parental consent
in these sections was to protect someone who secured such
consent from being prosecuted criminally, or subject to an ac-
tion for damages or injunctive relief, with regard to activities
62. The legislative history of §§ 50 and 51 is scarce. See generally Shields IV, 58
N.Y.2d at 349, 448 N.E.2d at 113, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 259.
63. Id. at 344, 448 N.E.2d at 110, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 256.
64. Id. at 344, 448 N.E.2d at 110, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 257 (emphasis added). See gener-
ally Welch v. Mr. Christmas, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 143 (1982).
65. Shields IV, 58 N.Y.2d at 346, 448 N.E.2d at 111, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 257.
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embraced in the sections during the period the consent was ef-
fective. Nothing in the sections even purports to address the
infant's right to disaffirm such consent, and we see nothing in
the language of the sections nor the rights that they were
designed to protect that would require an interpretation so in-
consistent with the general common-law principle and the
clear meaning of [prior statutes dealing with a minor's right to
disaffirm a contract].66
The appellate division and the court of appeals, in one re-
spect, interpreted the statute's purpose almost identically.
Both courts agreed that the statute establishes a right of pri-
vacy otherwise not available at common law, and that the right
exists until a person gives written consent for commercial in-
vasion. Thus, it serves to protect citizens from unremunerated
use of their names, portraits, or pictures for advertising or
trade. Beyond this point, they did not agree on how far this
protection should extend when an infant and a commercial
user of his photograph are involved. On this issue, they both
seemed to agree that the consent provisions of section 50, in-
cluding that for minors, was enacted to protect the commercial
users, but the appellate division did not see this protection as
overriding the infant's common law right to disaffirm. 7
If the privacy law was enacted in response to the Roberson
facts, then the legislature may have intended only to provide a
means by which persons who have not provided written con-
sent could seek redress and protection from commercial ex-
ploitation of their privacy.68 The fact that the plaintiff in
Roberson was a minor seems insignificant. Infancy may have
66. Shields III, 88 A.D.2d at 848, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 421. For a discussion of prior stat-
utes, see, e.g., supra note 31, and N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAw §§ 3-102(1), 3-103, and 3-105(1)-
(2).
67. In agreement with the appellate division's view was a dissenting justice of the
court of appeals: "I believe that the interests of society and this state in protecting its
children must be placed above any concern for trade or commercialism. . . ." Shields
IV, 58 N.Y.2d at 347, 448 N.E.2d at 112, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 258 (Jasen, J., dissenting). The
dissent continued: "In those situations in which the Legislature has decided that busi-
ness ventures need additional protection, it has done so not merely by abolishing the
infant's right to disaffirm, but, rather, by providing alternative protection, . . ." like
prior court approval of an infant's contract. Id. at 352, 448 N.E.2d at 115, 461 N.Y.S.2d at
261. "It is clear that [such statutes protect] not only the business interests which are
investing in and profiting from the child's talents, but also the child." Id. at 352-53, 448
N.E.2d at 115, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 261.
68. The court in Brinkley v. Casablanas, 80 A.D.2d 428, 432, 438 N.Y.S.2d 1004, 1007
(1981), characterized the purpose of § 51 as "remedial and rooted in popular resent-
ment at the refusal of the courts to grant recognition to the newly expounded right of
an individual to be immune from commercial exploitation."
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only been the extra fuel needed to ignite a dormant fire in the
legislature to encourage recognition of a legal right of privacy.
Under this theory, one could read the court of appeals deci-
sion in Shields as holding merely that the parental signature
requirement of section 50 is only intended to prevent a minor
from disaffirming a contract of consent and bringing a section
51 action for "unauthorized" use of a photograph that is al-
ready in print and being used for advertising and trade. Such
an interpretation would not, however, impair a minor's ability
to disaffirm a contract of consent outside of a section 51 action
as to any previously uncommitted future uses of the photo-
graph. It should be noted that allowing for disaffirmance of a
contract does not necessarily mean that there has been or will
be an invasion of privacy.
69
The dissent in the court of appeals decision in Shields was
troubled by the majority's conclusion that an infant could
never, even after reaching majority, modify consent as to fu-
ture use of nude photographs unless the parent had included
restrictions in the consent form when it was initially exe-
cuted.70 The dissenting justice did not outrightly disagree with
the majority regarding Shields's right to undo the written con-
sent given by her mother, "so as to affect prior benefits derived
by a person relying on the validity of the consent pursuant to
sections 50 and 51 of the Civil Rights Law."'" Rather, he was
more concerned with totally eliminating all the safeguards that
the state normally provides for children as parens patriae
when a parent fails to protect the child's interest.
The concerns of the dissenting justice would have been ade-
quately addressed if sections 50 and 51 had been interpreted so
as not to totally interfere with an infant's right to disaffirm a
written contract of consent. He believed that "[w]hen both
[the privacy and disaffirmance] rights are viewed ... as pro-
tection for the child, logic and policy compels the conclusion
that the two rights should exist coextensively."72
The conclusion of the court of appeals dissent seems worka-
ble enough, but this does not necessarily mean that the hold-
69. Cf. CBS, Inc. v. Tucker, 412 F. Supp. 1222, 1226 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) ("the right to
disaffirm does not necessarily carry with it the right to obtain the particular relief
sought following disaffirmance").
70. Shields IV, 58 N.Y.2d at 347, 448 N.E.2d at 112, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 258.
71. Id. (emphasis in original).
72. Id. at 350, 448 N.E.2d at 114, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 260.
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ing of the court of appeals was incorrect. From the point of
view of legal precedent, the court of appeals may have had lit-
tle choice in affirming the special term's conclusion that sec-
tion 50 abrogates an infant's common law right to disaffirm.
Without this holding, section 51 would have little or no protec-
tion for the defendant who acted in reliance upon its statutory
requirements, thus leaving him liable for damages or paying
preparatory expenses for future uses that could not be
recouped when an infant disaffirms. Such a defendant might
even find himself confronted with a preliminary or permanent
injunction based on the infant's disaffirmance alone.
IV
Additional Issues Raised by the Shields Case
A. Injunction
How does the court know that a preliminary and/or perma-
nent injunction is appropriate under section 51 when there is a
question about an infant's right to disaffirm? Even when the
right to disaffirm is unquestioned, how does the court deter-
mine that the defendant would continue to exploit the contract
after the right to disaffirm has been exercised? What if the de-
fendant had no equivocal notification of disaffirmance until le-
gal action was commenced? These are some of the questions
raised by the Shields case that were not specifically answered
by the courts.
73
As a general rule, there must be an adequate showing of ir-
reparable harm or damage to warrant the granting of a prelimi-
nary injunction.4 Courts will issue a preliminary injunction
only upon a "clear showing of either (1) probable success on
the merits and possible irreparable injury, or (2) sufficiently
serious questions going to the merits to make them a fair
ground for litigation and a balance of hardships tipping decid-
edly toward the party requesting preliminary relief. '75 It is an
award of extraordinary relief intended to maintain the status
73. This author speculates that the court did not address these issues because of
Gross's stipulation in Shields 1I to restrain his use of the photographs. See infra text
accompanying notes 107-24.
74. 47 N.Y. Jun. Right of Privacy § 31 (1969). See, e.g., All v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F.
Supp. 723, 726 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); CBS, Inc. v. Tucker, 412 F. Supp. 1222, 1225 (S.D.N.Y.
1976).
75. CBS, Inc. v. Tucker, 412 F. Supp. at 1225 (quoting Sonesta Int'l Hotels Corp. v.
Wellington Assoc., 483 F.2d 247, 250).
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quo between the parties until final determination of the merits
of the case. 6
Permanent injunctions, on the other hand, are, as a general
rule, issued at the court's discretion after it weighs factors such
as the "availability of an adequate legal remedy, the difficulties
of administering and enforcing the order, whether the injunc-
tion will prove effective, the possibility of irreparable harm,
and whether the applicant has 'unclean hands' or is guilty of
laches. 77 The injunction developed in the equity courts as a
means of providing relief in situations where, given the nature
of the case, an award of damages would be an inadequate or
impotent remedy.78 Injunction orders normally have to set
forth the reasons for issuance in specific terms and detail the
acts sought to be restrained. It is binding only upon the parties
to the action, their agents, and those persons in active concert
or participation with them who receive actual notice of the or-
der by personal service or otherwise.79
The issue of whether an infant, after a valid disaffirmance,
may obtain a preliminary or permanent injunction against a
party with whom she has contracted, in order to prohibit fur-
ther exploitation of the contract, was raised in CBS, Inc. v.
76. Id. See also N.Y. Crv. PRAc. LAw § 6301 (McKinney 1980). Section 6301 reads as
follows:
A preliminary injunction may be granted in any action when it appears that
the defendant threatens or is about to do, or is doing or procuring or suffering
to be done, an act in violation of the plaintiff's rights respecting the subject of
the action, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual, or in any action
where the plaintiff has demanded and would be entitled to a judgment re-
straining the defendant from the commission or continuance of an act, which,
if committed or continued during the pendency of the action, would produce
injury to the plaintiff. A temporary restraining order may be granted pending
a hearing for a preliminary injunction where it appears that immediate and
irreparable injury, loss or damage will result unless the defendant is re-
strained before the hearing can be had.
77. J. COUND, J. FRIEDENTHAL & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERI-
ALs 942-43 (3d ed. 1980).
78. Id. at 365-66.
79. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C.A. Rule 65(d) (West 1982). Rule 65(d) reads as follows:
(d) Form and Scope of Injunction or Restraining Order.
Every order granting an injunction and every restraining order shall set forth
the reasons for its issuance; shall be specific in terms; shall describe in reason-
able detail, and not by reference to the complaint or other document, the act or
acts sought to be restrained; and is binding only upon the parties to the action,
their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and upon those per-
sons in active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of
the order by personal service or otherwise.
COMM/ENT L. J.
Tucker.80 The Tucker case involved Tanya Tucker, an infant
recording artist, who disaffirmed her contract with the plaintiff,
CBS, Inc., and sought a preliminary injunction to prevent re-
lease of her previously recorded but unreleased recordings af-
ter she had begun releasing albums under a signed contract
with the Music Corporation of America (MCA). The court re-
fused to grant the preliminary injunction because it could not
find sufficient evidence of irreparable harm to the defendant's
career.8 1 Unfortunately, the court refused to decide if an infant
could obtain a permanent injunction after a valid disaffirmance
of a contract. The Tucker court stated that in its view the per-
manent injunction question was one of first impression under
New York law and that "such questions are best not resolved
in the context of a motion for a preliminary injunction." 2
The court of appeals' determination in Shields that a con-
tract of consent could not be disaffirmed did not resolve the
permanent injunction issue left open by the Tucker case. Like
the court in Tucker, the trial term court and the court of ap-
peals in Shields ruled against a finding of irreparable harm. 3
However, once a contract is disaffirmed by an infant, a per-
manent injunction issued solely on the basis of the defendant's
past use, which at the time was in accordance with the terms of
a then-existing contract, may be unduly restrictive when the
defendant has not committed any illegal act on which to base
the injunction. As a means of predicting future use, the issu-
ance of an injunction may be rather costly and inefficient.
Even if the court of appeals had held that Brooke could disaf-
firm her contract as to future use, it does not necessarily follow
that the court would then have been in the position to conclude
from the evidence before it that the plaintiff would suffer irrep-
arable harm simply because she was currently "embarrassed
by the pictures."84 In short, the court of appeals had little or no
80. 412 F. Supp. at 1226-27.
81. Id. at 1225-26.
82. Id. at 1226-27 (citations omitted). To date, this issue does not seem to have
been addressed by the New York courts.
83. Shields 11, 186 N.Y.LJ. at 13.
84. See Shields 11, 186 N.Y.L.J. 13 (1981); see also CBS, Inc. v. Tucker, 412 F. Supp.
at 1229.
[T]he Court has no difficulty crediting the sincerity of Miss Tucker's feelings
that her career belongs to her . . . that she wants to exercise control over it
.... It is a feeling, however, which is beside the point with respect to the
legal issues before the Court. Counsel for the defendant has been unable to
direct the Court to any legal authority to support his urgently advanced posi-
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evidence to support a permanent injunction. This conclusion
is even clearer in light of the Shields determination that
Brooke is barred from bringing a section 51 action for injunc-
tive relief, because valid consents were given which the court
held could not be disaffirmed.
Further issues arise over the issuance of even a modified in-
junction against Gross, given the length of time between the
claimed uncontested use and the institution of the action, and
the degree of harm suffered by Brooke Shields. First, the trial
term specifically found that "given the extended period of time
before protest was made as to alternative use, any recovery
would also be precluded by the doctrine of laches and estop-
pel."85 Once it was determined that the consent contract could
not be disaffirmed under sections 50 and 51, this finding could
have also been applied in denying the issuance of an injunc-
tion had Gross not stipulated that he would restrict himself.8 6
On the other hand, had the court determined that the con-
tract could be disaffirmed, the plaintiff's tardiness in protesting
would not suffice to bar the issuance of an injunction against
the defendant. As a general rule, an infant's right to disaffirm a
contract remains in effect until a reasonable time after he
reaches majority."7 Actions to recover damages under section
51 must be brought within one year" except when the person
entitled to commence the action is disabled, 9 in which case the
time limit would be extended by the period of the disability;90
the doctrine of laches and estoppel would therefore be
inappropriate.9 1
With regard to the irreparable harm that Brooke Shields
tion that an artist has a particular right, which should be recognized by this
Court, to control the direction of her own career, despite the realities of con-
tractual relationships and like obstacles. . . .A finding of irreparable harm
can hardly be based simply upon the fact that this individual cannot control
circumstances in the way in which she would like.
Id. Cf. Heldman v. U.S. Lawn Tennis Ass'n, 354 F. Supp. 1241, 1251 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
85. Shields 11, 186 N.Y.L.J. at 13.
86. See infra text accompanying notes 107-24.
87. See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
88. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. R. § 215(3) (McKinney 1972).
89. Id. § 208. "Disability" is defined as infancy, insanity, or imprisonment.
90. One of the arguments raised by defendant Gross was that Brooke Shields's
action should be barred by the one-year statute of limitations. The special term judge
said that "since [she] is presently only 16 years of age, plaintiff is justified in contend-
ing that the statute has not begun to run during the period of her infancy." Shields I,
186 N.Y.L.J. at 4.
91. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
COMM/ENT L. I.
would suffer if the pictures were published, she herself had
published at least one of the pictures in her own book. The
opinions do not indicate whether she intended to remove the
books from the market because of her "embarrassment. '92
Since preliminary and permanent injunctions normally re-
quire some element of irreparable harm before they will be is-
sued,93 a finding that Brooke Shields would suffer irreparable
harm would have been in serious doubt had Gross not stipu-
lated to that effect.
In addition to Brooke Shields's personal publication of
Gross's pictures, she had also been photographed nude by
Francesco Scavullo. These pictures of Brooke Shields were
not protested although they were intended "to portray her
youthful and formless body adorned by a perfectly sculptured
face."94 In assessing Shields's career thus far as a model, ac-
tress, and public personality, the trial term judge noted:
It is precisely the attempt to garner the widest possible ap-
peal and to be all things to all people which give rise to the
contradiction and the difficulties to which she is exposed. We
are presented with an image of a sweet, unspoiled, normal ado-
lescent in her private life, while in public her appearances in
photographs and motion pictures is based on tantalizing allure
and a veiled tinge of eroticism. She is presented as a unique
compound of innocence and sexuality.95
The judge went on to characterize Teri Shields's handling of
Brooke's career as business manager, promoter, and con-
cerned parent, as follows:
It is she who decided what jobs Brooke would take and what
roles she would appear in. Both the photographs for which she
modeled and the motion pictures for which she appeared show
a variability in judgment. She must be responsible not only for
what she does for her child, but to her child. She has chosen to
engender an image of Brooke Shields which is sexually provoc-
92. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
93. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
94. Shields H, 186 N.Y.L.J. at 13.
95. Id. The films referred to by the court are probably "Pretty Baby" (in which
Brooke plays a child prostitute and the film contains nudity); "Blue Lagoon" (in which
Brooke plays a young girl marooned on an island alone with a young boy of the same
age, where they reach puberty, start to discover each other's bodies, and experience
love and childbirth before they are rescued, in addition to the fim containing nudity);
"Endless Love" (in which Brooke plays a teenager obsessively in love, and which also
contains nudity). "In two of her films, 'Blue Lagoon' and 'Endless Love,' stand-ins
were used for [Brooke's] scenes requiring nudity." Shields I, 186 N.Y.L.J. at 4.
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ative and exciting, while attempting to preserve her innocence.
While attempting to provide her with the normal life of a high
school girl, she has also exposed her to the whirl of the discos,
Studio 54, Regine's and Xenon, being as much a part of her nor-
mal diet as her high school homework. She cannot have it both
ways. When one walks a narrow fence, one courts the risk of a
fall. While defense counsel in this case was searching out sin
with the wrath and thunder of an Old Testament prophet, what
he demonstrated was that Mrs. Shields is a person of contrast-
ing strengths and weaknesses and an altogether fallible human
being.
96
The trial term's assessment, albeit in dicta, infers that young
Shields's career has followed a well-monitored and lucrative
path. To suggest that the photographs are irreparably harmful
to her career because they invade her privacy would negate
the very basis upon which her career continues to be built. Au-
thorities generally agree that the right to privacy is a right "to
be let alone. 97 The reasonableness of the intrusion upon pri-
vacy is often a consideration in determining whether a tort has
occurred. For instance, once a performer places himself in the
public eye, he becomes a public figure and his right to privacy
is generally considered waived.98
There is little doubt that Brooke Shields, after starring in nu-
merous movies and television specials and posing for the cov-
ers of the country's top magazines, has become a "public
figure" as the term is understood today.9 9 A public figure does
not, however, surrender all right to privacy. Although his pri-
vacy is necessarily limited by the newsworthiness of his activi-
ties, he retains the independent right to have his personality,
even if newsworthy, free from commercial exploitation at the
hands of another.10 Only the more intimate details of a public
96. Id. But cf. supra notes 66-72 and accompanying text. It was probably not ad-
vantageous for the defense counsel to have the court interpret this presentation of Teri
Shields's guidance of her daughter's life as one which would lead her down a path of
sin. Such a conclusion would only lend support to court of appeals Judge Jasen's dis-
senting argument that the state should step in to protect a minor's welfare when his
parents fail to adequately do so.
97. See Meltzer, A New Approach To An Entertainer's Right Of Performance, 59
WASH. U.L.Q. 1269 (1982). See generally PROSSER, supra note 49, at 802-18.
98. Id. Accord Ann-Margret v. High Soc'y Magazine, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 401
(S.D.N.Y. 1980).
99. Ann-Margret v. High Soc'y Magazine, Inc., 498 F. Supp. at 404; see also numer-
ous cases cited therein.
100. Brinkley v. Casablancas, 80 A.D.2d 428, 438 N.Y.S.2d 1004, 1008 (1981).
COMM/ENT L. J.
figure's life retain privacy protection. 1 1
The revealing of one's body is, for most people, the most inti-
mate disclosure they could ever make. However, once consent
has been given to be viewed nude there should be no grounds
for an invasion of privacy action. 102 Prior to signing the release
forms, the Shieldses were informed by Gross that the nude pic-
tures of Brooke would be published by Playboy Press. At the
very least, they were aware that the pictures would be dissemi-
nated or accessible to the general public. In light of the un-
restricted nature of the consent form, any subsequent
reproduction of the photographs in magazines or the availabil-
ity to an audience not originally contemplated by the plaintiff
should have no effect on the defendant's freedom to use them
as he pleases.0 3
Courts have previously reached such conclusions with re-
gard to faithful reproductions of public figures from films in
which they had consented to appear.' The theory has been
that the publication of a film performance puts the film and any
subsequent photographs taken from it into the public domain
as a newsworthy event.0 5 In Shields, most of the photographs
sought to be enjoined from use for advertising or trade had al-
ready been published under a valid and unavoidable contract
of consent. There was, therefore, no basis for restricting the
manner or purpose for which Gross could use or license the
previously published photographs.0 6
101. Meltzer, supra note 97, at 1282-83.
102. Accord Ann-Margret v. High Soc'y Magazine, Inc., 488 F. Supp. at 405.
103. Id.; Sherwood v. McGowan, 152 N.Y.S.2d 658; 3 Misc. 2d 234 (1956). Cf. Welch v.
Mr. Christmas, 57 N.Y.2d 143 (1982), aff'g 85 A.D.2d 74 (1982).
104. See, e.g., Ann-Margret v. High Soc'y Magazine, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 401.
105. Brinkley v. Casablancas, 80 A.D.2d 428, 438 N.Y.S.2d 1004; Ann-Margret v. High
Soc'y Magazine, Inc., 488 F. Supp. at 406.
106. As to the unpublished photographs, the court could have relied on previous
cases to establish that the photographs had not yet become a newsworthy event. See,
e.g., Streisand v. High Soc'y Magazine, Inc., No. 79-5132 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 1979), which
involved pictures derived from outtakes of "The Owl and the Pussycat" that were
never made public. The case was settled without opinion, after entry of a preliminary
injunction in support of the plaintiff's position; it is cited in Ann-Margret v. High Soc'y
Magazine, Inc., 488 F. Supp. at 406 n.10. See also Brinkley v. Casablancas, 80 A.D.2d 428,
438 N.Y.S.2d 1004, in which the photograph of the plaintiff used in a poster was taken
during an original filming but was never published. The plaintiff in Brinkley, who had
retained the right to approve poster proofs, had consented to the television filming and
the release of other photographs, but not the photograph used in the poster at issue.
In reality, however, absent a disaffirmance right, the Shields courts could not have
restricted the use of the unpublished photographs unless they had determined that
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B. Stipulation
Since an injunction was not warranted in the Shields case,
the question remains how the courts were then able to issue
a partial permanent injunction against Gross, restraining him
from using the photographs in "pornographic magazines or
publications whose appeal is of a predominantly prurient na-
ture" and charging him with the duty of policing their use.
1 7
As indicated in the facts previously set forth, the photographs
of the plaintiff had appeared not only in Playboy's "Sugar and
Spice," but also in a French magazine called Photo.I°8 Accord-
ing to one concurrence to the appellate division decision, the
photographs also appeared, unlicensed by Gross, in two sexu-
ally oriented magazines, Celeb and Rustler, which were sold at
newsstands in New York City subsequent to the trial term
court's decision. 0 9
For some unexplained reason, the defendant stipulated in
the trial term court that he would agree not to license the use
of the photographs to pornographic magazines or those appeal-
ing to the prurient interest."0 Arguably, this may have been a
wise defensive move on the part of the defendant's counsel to
insure that his client would not lose full use of the photo-
graphs. Given Gross's desire to display the photographs as
works of art,"' this may not have been a very important matter
to stipulate. However, the various court opinions do not dis-
cuss Gross's reasons for the stipulation nor, more importantly,
the legal basis for issuing the partial permanent injunction.
Once the stipulation had been made by Gross, it sufficed as a
basis upon which the courts could issue the injunction." 2 How-
the consents were restricted, unconscionable, against public policy, or with a stipula-
tion by defendant to be so restricted.
107. Shields II, 186 N.Y.L.J. at 13; Shields IV, 58 N.Y.2d at 338, 448 N.E.2d at 109-10,
461 N.Y.S.2d at 255-56.
108. See supra text accompanying notes 12-18.
109. Shields III, 88 A.D.2d at 849, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 422-23 (Asch, J., concurring).
110. Shields IV, 58 N.Y.2d at 343, 448 N.E.2d at 109, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 255-56.
111. Shields II, 186 N.Y.L.J. at 13.
112. 28 U.S.C.A. Rule 65(d) (West 1982). 28 U.S.C.A. Rule 16 (West 1981) reads as
follows:
In any action, the court may in its discretion direct the attorneys for the par-
ties to appear before it for a conference to consider
(1) The simplification of the issues;
(2) The necessity or desirability of amendments to the pleadings;
(3) The possibility of obtaining admissions of fact and of documents which
will avoid unnecessary proof;
COMM/ENT L. J.
ever, a modified permanent injunction, like that issued by the
court of appeals in this case, should, for numerous reasons, be
strictly limited to the Shields situation, where the court re-
ceives an agreement from the defendant to be so enjoined.
First, Gross did not violate the terms of the release contract
since it was determined to be for unrestricted use. Second, in-
junctive relief under section 51 is not available to an infant
claiming disaffirmance based on unwritten consent when, in
fact, written parental consent was given. Third, the trial term
ruled, and the court of appeals agreed, that the photographs
were neither obscene nor pornographic, and thereby raised
few moral public policy issues; moreover, the plaintiff also
stated that the pictures were neither obscene nor porno-
graphic. Fourth, Brooke used the photographs in her own
book. Last, Brooke had accepted payment in full for her mod-
eling service. To have imposed an injunction on Gross under
these facts, outside of his stipulation, would have required the
court to modify the essential terms of the release contract.
The key element necessary for the issuance of an injunction
under section 51 is that the use be made without written con-
sent."3 A valid unrestricted written consent from Mrs. Shields
did exist; therefore an injunction without Gross's stipulation
could not have been issued. This is particularly true since the
statute contemplates the absence of consent in written form as
the condition necessary to bring into effect a right of privacy.
Once written consent was obtained, Brooke had no more right
to a privacy action than she did at common law.
The extent of Gross's obligation under the stipulation seems
somewhat controversial. The trial term judge simply re-
strained Gross from "licensing the use of the photographs" to
(4) The limitation of the number of expert witnesses;
(5) The advisability of a preliminary reference of issues to a master for
findings to be used as evidence when the trial is to be by jury;
(6) Such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the action.
The court shall make an order which recites the action taken at the conference, the
amendments allowed to the pleadings, and the agreements made by the parties as to
any of the matters considered, and which limits the issues for trial to those not dis-
posed of by admissions or agreements of counsel; and such order when entered con-
trols the subsequent course of the action, unless modified at the trial to prevent
manifest injustice. The court in its discretion may establish by rule a pre-trial calen-
dar on which actions may be placed for consideration as above provided and may
either confine the calendar to jury actions or to non-jury actions or extend it to all
actions.
113. See supra note 2.
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pornographic and prurient interest magazines for advertising
or trade. 4 The majority opinion of the appellate division ex-
tended the licensing injunction by enjoining the defendant
"from using any pictures of plaintiff at issue here for purposes
of advertising or trade."' 5 The first concurring justice in that
opinion, however, would have imposed an affirmative duty on
the defendant to "prosecute any unlicensed uses in porno-
graphic magazines."" 6 The court of appeals, possibly in error,
went even further, stating in its opinion that the trial term
court had "charged [the defendant] with the duty of policing
their use.""
' 7
Did Gross actually stipulate that he would police and/or at-
tempt to prosecute any unlicensed use of the photographs at
his own expense? This seems highly unlikely. It is one thing
for Gross to agree that he would not license the use of the pho-
tographs to others for use in pornographic magazines; it is
quite another to expect Gross to search through pornographic
magazines for unauthorized uses of his photographs and, fur-
ther, to prosecute any persons responsible. While such a re-
quirement might ultimately compensate Gross for the
unauthorized use of his property, such expense and effort
places an undue burden on the defendant.
Section 50 provides that anyone who uses a person's name,
portrait, or picture for advertising or trade purposes without
written consent is guilty of a misdemeanor. As section 50 is
penal in nature, the duty of policing and prosecuting such
wrongs is the responsibility of the State of New York.' 8 The
commission of a misdemeanor is a matter of public concern,
and the alleged guilty party can be prosecuted upon the com-
plaint of any person, whether aggrieved or not."19 Therefore,
the most that Gross should be required to do is file a complaint
114. Shields 11, 186 N.Y.L.J. at 13.
115. Shields I1, 88 A.D.2d at 848, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 421.
116. Id. at 849, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 422 (Asch, J., concurring).
117. Shields IV, 58 N.Y.2d at 343, 448 N.E.2d at 110, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 256.
118. Delan v. CBS, Inc., 111 Misc. 2d 928, 935 (Special Term, Queens County, 1981).
Plaintiff brought a § 50 action against defendant claiming invasion of privacy for film-
ing Delan while he was confined to a mental institution without first obtaining all of
the required consent forms from his doctors. The court noted that § 50 is a penal siat-
ute and was an erroneous choice of statutory basis for the plaintiffs cause of action.
Nevertheless, the court did not dismiss because the pleading stated some recognizable
form of a cause of action known to New York law. See also M. ERNST & A. ScHwARTz,
THE RIGHT To BE LET ALONE 127-48 (1977).
119. ERNST & ScHwARTz, supra note 118, at 170.
COMM/ENT L. J.
whenever any unauthorized uses of his photographs come to
his attention. 2 °
It should be noted that
the criminal provisions of section 50 are hardly, if ever, en-
forced. Most people who feel their privacy has been invaded
are more interested in stopping the publication, and in receiv-
ing money damages for the injury already done, than in send-
ing anyone to jail, even for a short period of time.
121
The criminal approach is generally not pursued because inva-
sions of privacy usually lack the "element of positive willful-
ness required in criminal proceedings.' 2 2  Furthermore,
prosecutors are probably too busy to pursue privacy invasions,
and the courts are not particularly receptive to the criminal
sanctions of section 50.123 In fact, some states' privacy statutes




Perhaps Brooke Shields would have been in a better legal
position in attempting to rescind her mother's consent to use
the photographs in question if that consent had never been put
into writing. Even the subsequent publication of the photos in
The Brooke Book would not have given Gross unlimited license
to use the pictures because the statute specifically requires
"written" consent.125 However, under the facts in the Shields
120. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text. Cf. Shields III, 88 A.D.2d at 849,
451 N.Y.S.2d at 423 (concurring Justice Asch's reasons for feeling that the policing re-
quirements of the injunction could not be met). See also infra text accompanying
notes 125-36.
121. ERNEST & SCHWARTZ, supra note 118, at 173; M. MAYER, RIGHTS OF PRIVACY 203-
05 (1972).
122. M. MAYER, supra note 121, at 203.
123. In People v. McBride & Co., 159 Misc. 5 (N.Y. Magis. Ct. 1936), the court held
that § 50, as a criminal law, must be strictly construed. The court found that it was not
criminal to make a modest reference to a man involved in strike-breaking in a legiti-
mate study on the subject. In Maggio v. Charles Scribner's Sons, 205 Misc. 818, 130
N.Y.S.2d 514 (N.Y. Magis. Ct. 1954), the plaintiff brought a criminal complaint charging
the publisher and producer of "From Here to Eternity" with using a character with
traits and a last name identical to his. The court dismissed.
124. See, e.g., CAL. Crv. CODE § 3344(a) (West 1972) (making the invader "liable for
any damages sustained by the person or persons injured as a result thereof. In addi-
tion, in any action brought under this section, the person who violated the section shall
be liable to the injured party or parties in an amount no less than $300.00.").
125. 47 N.Y. JuR. Privacy § 16 (1966); Lomax v. New Broadcasting Co., 18 A.D.2d 229,
238 N.Y.S.2d 781 (1963). On the contrary, it might be legitimately argued that The
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case, and as the statute is written, no rights of Brooke were
violated.
A concurring judge in the appellate division decision recog-
nized this contradiction, which would explain his attempt to
find an alternative solution, a determination that the contract
was unconscionable under the New York Uniform Commercial
Code section 2-302.126 This justice believed that the Shields
contract cried out to be treated as unconscionable. He particu-
larly focused on Brooke's age when the photographs were
taken and the uncontrolled dissemination of the photos in un-
authorized magazines; in his opinion, the photographs viewed
in or out of the context of the magazines were damaging to
Brooke while she was still a minor and after she reached ma-
jority. He pointed to Mrs. Shields's confession that the con-
sents were mistakes in parental judgment and Brooke's
current reaction to the photographs of her as a child. He
viewed Brooke's plight as that of a "hapless child victim of a
contract of adhesion to which two grasping adults bound
her."12
7
This justice also did not believe that a limited injunction,
along with Gross's stipulation, would stop the photographs
from appearing in sexually oriented magazines. 28 Under the
unconscionability provisions of section 2-302, the court could
have directed the defendant to return the photographs, estab-
Brooke Book constituted newsworthy subject matter making publication of the pic-
tures after publication of The Brooke Book unprotected by §§ 50 and 51.
126. Shields III, 88 A.D.2d at 848, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 421-22 (Asch, J., concurring). Sec-
tion 2-302(1) allows the court discretion to
"refuse to enforce the contract," or to "enforce the remainder of the contract
without the unconscionable clause," or to "limit the application of any uncon-
scionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result." Thus, the advantage
of employing the "unconscionability" provisions of section 2-302 in this case is
that the court may take direct action to require the return of those photo-
graphs which offend rather than to set aside the entire transaction.
Id. at 850, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 423-24.
127. Id. at 850, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 423. It is hard to conclude from the various court
opinions whether Brooke Shields was embarrassed by the blowups of the photographs
in the salon window as well as by their appearances in the magazines. Assuming such
a conclusion could be reached, it would lend further support to Justice Asch's attempt
to eliminate use of the photographs for any purpose. However, it would not explain
the apparent acceptance of the use of one of the photographs published in The Brooke
Book, as no order was issued by the court to have the books removed from the sale
racks. For a discussion of the irreparable harm these photographs had on Brooke
Shields's career, see supra notes 93-106 and accompanying text.
128. Id. at 849, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 422-23 (Asch, J., concurring). See supra text accom-
panying note 16.
COMM/ENT L. J.
lished a time limit on their use, or set out whatever conditions
were necessary to eliminate any unconscionable aspect of the
contract.
129
According to this concurring justice, the invocation of
unconscionability
authorizes the court to police outrageous transactions directly,
rather than indirectly by manipulating traditional common law
doctrines. It would make it unnecessary for [the] court to en-
graft a construction on sections 50 and 51 which ultimately may
not be ratified by the Legislature or the Court of Appeals. It
would provide a mechanism for fact evaluation and for the
fabrication of a remedy which is specifically designed to fit this
case.
130
To bring the consent contract within the parameters of the
Uniform Commercial Code, the justice stated that the sale or
offering for sale of the pictures of the plaintiff "was obviously
for the purpose of trade ...and would be a sale of goods
within the Uniform Commercial Code."'131 He construed
Gross's photographing of Brooke as a contract for the sale of
pictures rather than as a contract for Shields's services as a
model.132 He formulated such a construction despite the fact
that the plaintiff did not raise this issue or present evidence on
it either at trial or on appeal. For this reason, the court of ap-
peals refused to consider the issue of unconscionability.
133
While the unconscionability argument did not help the plain-
tiff in Shields, it might prove useful in future cases involving an
infant desiring to disaffirm a parent's written consent. While
the Shields decision precludes an infant from disaffirming pa-
rental consent under sections 50 and 51, a finding that a con-
tract is substantially or procedurally unconscionable could
give an infant a basis upon which to have the contract modified
or set aside. 134 The major obstacle to succeeding with this ar-
gument could be convincing the court that modeling for photo-
graphs is a contract for the sale of goods rather than just for
129. Id. at 850, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 423.
130. Id. at 848, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 421-22.
131. Id. at 848, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 422 (Judge Asch quoting 47 N.Y. JUR. Privacy § 20
(1966), which cites Holmes v. Underwood and Underwood, Inc., 225 A.D. 369, 233 N.Y.S.
153, and Carpel v. Saget Studios, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 1331, 1333 (1971) (holding that under
12(A) PA. U.C.C. § 2-105 (1970), the sale of photographs would be a sale of goods within
§ 2-105)).
132. Shields IV, 58 N.Y.2d at 343, 448 N.E.2d at 110, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 256.
133. Id.
134. See N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-302 (McKinney 1974).
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services.135 Authorities indicate, however, that Article 2 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, dealing with the sale of goods, has
been broadly construed to apply to numerous transactions ar-
guably outside the literal coverage of that article. 36
D. Child Pornography and Public Policy
Ignoring for the moment Gross's stipulation, and accepting
the finding that the consents were valid, the rationale the court
could have best used to restrict Gross's use would have been
one based on a public policy as a means of protecting mi-
nors. 37 The unconscionability argument posited by the appel-
late division judge is clearly based on a public desire to have
the courts modify or eliminate contracts which are a result of
unfair bargaining and contract terms.
138
In addition, further policy concerns become evident when
the subject matter of the photographs becomes an issue. From
the very beginning, the plaintiff did not contend that the photo-
graphs were obscene or pornographic. Her only complaint was
that she was "embarrassed."'39 The trial term judge stated in
his opinion that the photographs were not pornographic or
erotic.140 However, one wonders what the outcome of this case
would have been had Brooke claimed that the pictures were
obscene or pornographic.'
4 '
Disregarding The Brooke Book for the moment, the plaintiff
might have been able to prevail under New York's Penal Law
section 263.11 Section 263.05 makes criminal the knowing use
of a child under sixteen years of age in a "sexual perform-
135. See N.Y. U.C.C. §§ 2-105(1)-(2) (McKinney 1974).
136. CALAmARI & PERL o, supra note 35, at 322.
137. The court in which a suit is pending generally has the power to sanction a com-
promise of the infant's claim. The court is bound to investigate the fairness of the
compromise, its terms, and assertions to determine whether the infant's rights will be
fully protected. 42 AM. Ju-. 2D Infants § 153 (1969).
138. See supra notes 125-36 and accompanying text.
139. Shields IV, 58 N.Y.2d at 346, 448 N.E.2d at 112, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 258.
140. Shields II, 186 N.Y.L.J. at 13.
141. The dissent in Shields IV did address the pornography issue. See Shields IV,
58 N.Y.2d at 351, 448 N.E.2d at 114, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 260 (Jasen, J., dissenting) (citing New
York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982)).
142. While Brooke Shields's use of one photograph in her book might have pre-
cluded her assertion that the photograph was obscene, it should be noted that § 263 is a
penal statute. It is intended to define which "uses" of children in '"performance" will
be considered sexual and thus criminal. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 263.05 also makes it illegal
for a parent or guardian to consent to the participation of a child under 16 years of age
in a sexual performance.
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ance."'43 Section 263.15 prohibiting as a class D felony "pro-
moting an obscene sexual performance by a child when,
knowing the character and content thereof, he produces, di-
rects or promotes any obscene performance which includes
sexual conduct by a child less than sixteen years of age."'"
Section 263.10, on the other hand, bans only the knowing dis-
semination of obscene material. 145 A "sexual performance" is
defined as "any obscene performance or part thereof which in-
cludes sexual conduct by a child less than 16 years of age."' 46
"Sexual conduct" is in turn defined as "actual or simulated
sexual intercourse . . . or lewd exhibition of the genitals.' 4 7
"Performance" includes in its definition any "photograph."'
48
In 1982, the United States Supreme Court decided the case of
New York v. Ferber,49 fifteen days before the appellate divi-
sion decision in Shields. In Ferber, the Court specifically ad-
dressed New York Penal Law section 263.15 regulating the
promotion, production or direction of a sexual performance by
a child.150 The main issue before the Supreme Court was
whether the state of New York could, "consistent with the First
Amendment, prohibit the dissemination of material which
shows children engaged in sexual conduct, regardless of
whether such material is obscene."'' The court began its in-
quiry by examining "whether a State has somewhat more free-
dom in proscribing works which portray sexual acts or lewd
exhibitions of genitalia by children."'52
The opinion of the court, as applied to Ferber and others who
143. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 263.05 (McKinney 1980).
144. Id. § 263.15. Class D felonies carry a maximum punishment of up to seven
years as to an individual and, as to corporations, a fine of up to $10,000. Id. §§ 70.00 &
80.10.
145. Id. § 263.10.
146. Id.
147. Id. § 263.00(3).
148. Id. § 263.00(4).
149. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
150. Paul Ferber owned a bookstore in Manhattan specializing in sexually oriented
products. He sold two films, devoted almost exclusively to depicting young boys mas-
turbating, to an undercover police officer. Ferber was indicted on two counts of violat-
ing N.Y. Penal Law § 263.10, which bans the knowing dissemination of obscene
material, but was acquitted after a jury trial. The same jury, however, did find him
guilty of two counts of violating N.Y. Penal Law § 263.15. See N.Y. PENAL LAW
§§ 263.00(1), (3), (4), 263.05. Ferber was sentenced to 45 days in prison. Ferber, 458 U.S.
at 751 n.3.
151. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 753.
152. Id.
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distribute similar material, held that "the statute does not vio-
late the First Amendment as applied to the States through the
Fourteenth."' 53 The Supreme Court said that the states are en-
titled to greater leeway in the regulation of pornographic de-
pictions of children because of a compelling interest in
guarding the physical and psychological well-being of a mi-
nor.' As a result of this compelling interest, a state may,
when pursuing those who distribute performances of children
involved in sexual conduct, go beyond the obscenity standard
established in Miller v. California5 ' because the standard
does not provide a satisfactory solution to the child pornogra-
phy problem.1 6 However, child pornography-which, like ob-
scenity, will be labeled as unprotected by the first
amendment-must be adequately defined.1 7 The Court noted
that the test for child pornography is separate from the obscen-
ity standard in Miller, but may be compared to it. A trier of
fact, when testing child pornography "need not find that the
material appeals to the prurient interest of the average person;
it is not required that sexual conduct portrayed be done so in a
patently offensive manner; and the material at issue need not
be considered as a whole."'
58
153. Id. at 774. Justice White wrote the plurality opinion, in which Chief Justice
Burger and Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor joined. Justice O'Connor filed a
concurring opinion. Justice Brennan filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in
which Justice Marshall joined. Justice Blackmun concurred in the result. Justice Ste-
vens filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.
154. Id. at 756-64.
155. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). Miller requires that state statutes designed to regulate ob-
scene materials sufficiently define what is prohibited. In order to devise substantive
limits regarding what fell within the permissible scope of such a regulation, the Miller
court held that a "state offense must also be limited to works which, taken as a whole,
appeal to the prurient interest in sex, which portray sexual conduct in a patently offen-
sive way, and which, taken as a whole, do not have serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value." Ferber, 458 U.S. at 755 (citing Miller v. California, 413 U.S. at 23).
156. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 760-61.
157. Id. at 764.
158. Id. Justice Stevens objected to this standard established by the plurality opin-
ion. He wrote:
Having defined that category [of nonobscene child pornography that New
York may legitimately prohibit] in an abstract setting, the Court makes the
empirical judgment that the arguably impermissible application of the New
York statute amounts to only a "tiny fraction of the materials within the stat-
ute's reach." [Citations omitted.] Even assuming that the Court's empirical
analysis is sound, I believe a more conservative approach to the issue would
adequately vindicate the State's interest in protecting its children and cause
less harm to the federal interest in free expression.
Id. at 778-79. (Stevens, J., concurring).
COMM/ENT L. I. [Vol. 6
Of particular significance to the Shields case is the rationale
for rejecting Ferber's claim that section 263.15 is unconstitu-
tionally overbroad.'5 9 The plurality opinion stated that any im-
permissible applications of the provision in question, that is, to
nude photographs of children having educational, medical, or
social value, would amount to no more than a "tiny fraction of
the materials within the statute's reach.' 160 In such circum-
stances, "whatever overbreadth may exist should be cured
through case-by-case analysis of the fact situations to which its
sanctions, assertedly, may not be applied."''
Perhaps the plurality opinion in Ferber is too optimistic
about New York's ability to conduct case-by-case applications
of section 263.15 without violating the first amendment. In two
separate concurring opinions, at least three other Justices did
not agree with the plurality's assessment. 62 One concurring
Justice felt that
[a] holding that respondent may be punished for selling these
two films does not require us to conclude that other users of
these very films, or that other motion pictures containing simi-
lar scenes, are beyond the pale of constitutional protection
.... [I]t is at least conceivable that a serious work of art, a
documentary on behavioral problems, or a medical or psychiat-
159. Id. at 767-68. The traditional rule is that a person to whom a statute may consti-
tutionally be applied may not challenge that statute on the ground that it may conceiv-
ably be applied unconstitutionally to others in situations not before the court. Id. at
766. The overbreadth doctrine is one of the few exceptions to this rule, used to attack
statutes that appear to be restraining the exercise of protected expression. Id. at 768.
In such cases, the courts have "allowed persons to attack overly broad statutes even
though the conduct of the person making the attack is clearly unprotected and could
be proscribed by a law drawn with the requisite specificity." Id. at 769. In order for a
statute to be invalidated, it must be established that the overbreadth involved be "sub-
stantial," especially in cases involving "conduct plus speech." Id. at 769-71.
160. Id. at 773.
161. Id. (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615-16 (1973)). In her concur-
ring opinion, Justice O'Connor wrote separately
to stress that the court does not hold that New York must except "material
with serious literary, scientific, or educational value" from its statute. The
Court merely holds that, even if the First Amendment shelters such material,
New York's current statute is not sufficiently overbroad to support respon-
dent's facial attack.
Id. at 774. Justice O'Connor explained that even if there are depictions of adolescent
sexual conduct that do not actually threaten to harm children emotionally, psychologi-
cally, or mentally, these possibilities need not be addressed by the Supreme Court
"because this potential overbreadth is not sufficiently substantial to warrant facial in-
validation." Id. at 775.
162. Justice Brennan filed an opinion in which Justice Marshall joined; Justice Ste-
vens filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.
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ric teaching device, might include a scene from one of these
films and, when viewed as a whole in a proper setting be enti-
tled to constitutional protection.
163
Two other concurring Justices believed that the "application
of section 263.15 or any similar statute to depictions of children
that in themselves do have serious literary, artistic, scientific,
or medical value, would violate the First Amendment."'64 They
asserted that the value of such depictions as "serious contribu-
tions to art, literature, or science, is, by definition, simply not
'de minimis'. . . The Court's assumption of harm to the child
resulting from the 'permanent record' and 'circulation' of the
child's 'participation,' lacks much of its force where the depic-
tion is a serious contribution to art or science.' 65
The Ferber case only adds to the uncertainty of first amend-
ment protections available for the art work of professional pho-
tographers who utilize the services of child models for nude
photographs. This is especially true, since Ferber did not dis-
cuss an earlier New York Appellate Division decision, People v.
McIntyre ,166 which addressed the evidence necessary to bring
an indictment for "performance" under section 263.00(4). In
McIntyre, the defendant took Polaroid photographs of his
twelve-year old niece in various states of undress and in differ-
ent postures. The trial court dismissed the indictment because
it felt that the evidence before the grand jury was not legally
sufficient to establish that the defendant had used the child in
a sexual performance. The appellate division reversed on the
grounds that a "performance" under section 263.00(4) is "any
play, motion picture, photograph, dance . . ." and, as so de-
fined, included the photographs taken by the defendant.
167
163. Id. at 777-78 (Stevens, J., concurring). This Justice did not feel that over-
breadth analysis was proper because it required application of the statute to facts not
before the court.
164. Id. at 776. (Brennan, J., concurring).
165. Id. On remand, the New York Court of Appeals concluded that Penal Law
§ 263.15, as applied in Ferber, "does not violate the right of freedom of expression guar-
anteed by the State Constitution." Ferber, 74 A.D.2d 558, 57 N.Y.2d 256, 259, (1982) (per
curiam). In a separate opinion, two of the court of appeals judges noted agreement
that the statute as applied to Ferber did not violate the state's constitution. However,
they also wanted to recognize "an affirmative defense for literary, scientific, educa-
tional, governmental or other similar justification, paralleling that now set forth in sub-
division 1 of section 235.15 of the Penal Law. Each of the four Supreme Court opinions
warns that the statute will have some unconstitutional applications." Id. at 260 (cita-
tions omitted).
166. 77 A.D.2d 810, 430 N.Y.S.2d 761 (1980).
167. Id. See also supra note 148 and accompanying text.
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Utilizing the McIntyre analysis in Shields, the photographs
of Brooke could constitute a performance under section 263
sufficient for the state to consider criminal charges against
Gross, even if Brooke did not press such charges herself.
The state interest in protecting children from child pornogra-
phy might override contractual relations with infants and pro-
vide one way around the holding in Shields that an infant




How the various opinions in Shields v. Gross will be viewed
depends to a large extent on how advanced or innocent we per-
ceive professional child models to be in today's society. Strong
advocates of an infant's common law right to disaffirm should
be appalled by the decision of the court of appeals, because it
can be read to have effectively eliminated this right in the con-
text of a section 51 privacy action.
This decision could be another "Roberson,"'1 68 leading to an
amendment of New York's Civil Rights Law. The New York
legislature could clarify sections 50 and 51 to permit disaffirm-
ance by infants at any time, despite written parental consent.
In the alternative, the statute could be amended to permit dis-
affirmance at any time but preclude a right to privacy action by
an infant under section 51, where previously valid consents ex-
isted, until a wrong is actually committed.
If the legislature chooses not to react with clarifying legisla-
tion, the common law rights of infants will remain totally abro-
gated with regard to any privacy rights under section 51, where
parental consent forms exist. The responsibility for limiting
the scope of consent in such releases would then be left in the
hands of the parent or guardian.
The scope of the holding in Shields has the potential of
reaching beyond the particular facts of that case. Under the
right circumstances, photographers may find themselves able
to rely on written parental consents for photographs of infants
as a means of instituting a breach of contract action against the
infant.
168. See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
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The New York legislature might consider amending General
Obligations Law section 3-105169 to include provisions requiring
court approval of infant modeling contracts where any signifi-
cant amount of nudity is required.
At present, the broad interpretation of sections 50 and 51 in
Shields could prove very beneficial to an industry currently
thriving on the promotion of beautiful child models, because it
forecloses a potential class of invasion of privacy actions. At
the same time, the result probably will not be particularly det-
rimental to the majority of child models who rarely pose nude.
For those children whose modeling jobs call for some nudity,
New York Penal Law section 263, prohibiting child pornogra-
phy, could provide another avenue of legal redress. Until such
argument is successful, child models will have to rely on the
good judgment of their parents or guardians.
169. See supra note 31 for text of statute.
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